him to accept the very
mission that had already proved so full of peril. In short, if the
plain truth must be told, Lord Wolseley was far more responsible for
the despatch of General Gordon to Khartoum than Mr Gladstone.
The result of the early representations of the Duke of Devonshire, and
the definite suggestion of Lord Wolseley, was that the Government gave
in when the public anxiety became so great at the continued silence of
Khartoum, and acquiesced in the despatch of an expedition to relieve
General Gordon. Having once made the concession, it must be allowed
that they showed no niggard spirit in sanctioning the expedition and
the proposals of the military authorities. The sum of ten millions was
devoted to the work of rescuing Gordon by the very persons who had
rejected his demands for the hundredth part of that total. Ten
thousand men selected from the _elite_ of the British army were
assigned to the task for which he had begged two hundred men in vain.
It is impossible here to enter closely into the causes which led to
the expansion of the three or four thousand British infantry into a
special corps of ten thousand fighting men, picked from the crack
regiments of the army, and composed of every arm of the service
compelled to fight under unaccustomed conditions. The local
authorities--in particular Major Kitchener, now the Sirdar of the
Egyptian army, who is slowly recovering from the Mahdi the provinces
which should never have been left in his possession--protested that
the expedition should be a small one, and if their advice had been
taken the cost would have been about one-fourth that incurred, and the
force would have reached Khartoum by that 11th November on which
Gordon expected to see the first man of it. But Major Kitchener,
although, as Gordon wrote, "one of the few really first-class officers
in the British army," was only an individual, and his word did not
possess a feather's weight before the influence of the Pall Mall band
of warriors who have farmed out our little wars--India, of course,
excepted--of the last thirty years for their own glorification. So
great a chance of fame as "the rescue of Gordon" was not to be left to
some unknown brigadiers, or to the few line regiments, the proximity
of whose stations entitled them to the task. That would be neglecting
the favours of Providence. For so noble a task the control of the most
experienced commander in the British army would alone suffice, and
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