gallant part in the attack. It was a pity for the
effect produced that that attack should have been distinctly
unsuccessful. The information the captain of these steamers, the
gallant Cassim el Mousse, gave about Gordon's position was alarming.
He stated that Gordon had sent him a message informing him that if aid
did not come in ten days from the 14th December his position would be
desperate, and the volumes of his journal which he handed over to Sir
Charles Wilson amply corroborated this statement--the very last entry
under that date being these memorable words: "Now, mark this, if the
Expeditionary Force--and I ask for no more than 200 men--does not come
in ten days, _the town may fall_, and I have done my best for the
honour of our country. Good-bye."
The other letters handed over by Cassim el Mousse amply bore out the
view that a month before the British soldiers reached the last stretch
of the Nile to Khartoum Gordon's position was desperate. In one to his
sister he concluded, "I am quite happy, thank God, and, like Lawrence,
have tried to do my duty," and in another to his friend Colonel
Watson: "I think the game is up, and send Mrs Watson, yourself, and
Graham my adieux. We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after
ten days. This would not have happened (if it does happen) if our
people had taken better precautions as to informing us of their
movements, but this is 'spilt milk.'" In face of these documents,
which were in the hands of Sir Charles Wilson on 21st January, it is
impossible to agree with his conclusion in his book "Korti to
Khartoum," that "the delay in the arrival of the steamers at Khartoum
was unimportant" as affecting the result. Every hour, every minute,
had become of vital importance. If the whole Jakdul column had been
destroyed in the effort, it was justifiable to do so as the price of
reinforcing Gordon, so that he could hold out until the main body
under Lord Wolseley could arrive. I am not one of those who think
that Sir Charles Wilson, who only came on the scene at the last
moment, should be made the scapegoat for the mistakes of others in the
earlier stages of the expedition, and I hold now, as strongly as when
I wrote the words, the opinion that, "in the face of what he did, any
suggestion that he might have done more would seem both ungenerous and
untrue." Still the fact remains that on 21st January there was left a
sufficient margin of time to avert what actually occurred at d
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