by those who sent him came to be understood and appreciated by the
nation.
The lapse of time has been sufficient to allow of a calm judgment
being passed on the whole transaction, and the considerations which I
have put forward with regard to it in the chronicle of events have
been dictated by the desire to treat all involved in the matter with
impartiality. If they approximate to the truth, they warrant the
following conclusions. The Government sent General Gordon to the
Soudan on an absolutely hopeless mission for any one or two men to
accomplish without that support in reinforcements on which General
Gordon thought he could count. General Gordon went to the Soudan, and
accepted that mission in the enthusiastic belief that he could arrest
the Mahdi's progress, and treating as a certainty which did not
require formal expression the personal opinion that the Government,
for the national honour, would comply with whatever demands he made
upon it. As a simple matter of fact, every one of those demands, some
against and some with Sir Evelyn Baring's authority, were rejected. No
incident could show more clearly the imperative need of definite
arrangements being made even with Governments; and in this case the
precipitance with which General Gordon was sent off did not admit of
him or the Government knowing exactly what was in the other's mind.
Ostensibly of one mind, their views on the matter in hand were really
as far as the poles asunder.
There then comes the second phase of the question--the alleged
abandonment of General Gordon by the Government which enlisted his
services in face of an extraordinary, and indeed unexampled danger and
difficulty. The evidence, while it proves conclusively and beyond
dispute that Mr Gladstone's Government never had a policy with regard
to the Soudan, and that even Gordon's heroism, inspiration, and
success failed to induce them to throw aside their lethargy and take
the course that, however much it may be postponed, is inevitable, does
not justify the charge that it abandoned Gordon to his fate. It
rejected the simplest and most sensible of his propositions, and by
rejecting them incurred an immense expenditure of British treasure and
an incalculable amount of bloodshed; but when the personal danger to
its envoy became acute, it did not abandon him, but sanctioned the
cost of the expedition pronounced necessary to effect his rescue. This
decision, too late as it was to assist in the
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