when he took the field his staff had to be on the extensive scale that
suited his dignity and position. As there would be some reasonable
excuse for the dispensation of orders and crosses from a campaign
against a religious leader who had not yet known defeat, any friend
might justly complain if he was left behind. To justify so brilliant a
staff, no ordinary British force would suffice. Therefore our
household brigade, our heavy cavalry, and our light cavalry were
requisitioned for their best men, and these splendid troops were
drafted and amalgamated into special corps--heavy and light
camelry--for work that would have been done far better and more
efficiently by two regiments of Bengal Lancers. If all this effort and
expenditure had resulted in success, it would be possible to keep
silent and shrug one's shoulders; but when the mode of undertaking
this expedition can be clearly shown to have been the direct cause of
its failure, silence would be a crime. When Lord Wolseley told the
soldiers at Korti on their return from Metemmah, "It was not _your_
fault that Gordon has perished and Khartoum fallen," the positiveness
of his assurance may have been derived from the inner conviction of
his own stupendous error.

The expedition was finally sanctioned in August, and the news of its
coming was known to General Gordon in September, before, indeed, his
own despatches of 31st July were received in London, and broke the
suspense of nearly half a year. He thought that only a small force was
coming, under the command of Major-General Earle, and he at once, as
already described, sent his steamers back to Shendy, there to await
the troops and convey them to Khartoum. He seems to have calculated
that three months from the date of the message informing him of the
expedition would suffice for the conveyance of the troops as far as
Berber or Metemmah, and at that rate General Earle would have arrived
where his steamers awaited him early in November. Gordon's views as to
the object of the expedition, which somebody called the Gordon Relief
Expedition, were thus clearly expressed:--

"I altogether decline the imputation that the projected
expedition has come to relieve me. It has come to save our
National honour in extricating the garrisons, etc., from a
position in which our action in Egypt has placed these garrisons.
I was Relief Expedition No. 1; they are Relief Expedition No. 2.
As for myself, I co