uld make good my retreat at any moment, if I
wished. Now realise what would happen if this first relief
expedition was to bolt, and the steamers fell into the hands of
the Mahdi. This second relief expedition (for the honour of
England engaged in extricating garrisons) would be somewhat
hampered. We, the first and second expeditions, are equally
engaged for the honour of England. This is fair logic. I came up
to extricate the garrison, and failed. Earle comes up to
extricate garrisons, and I hope succeeds. Earle does not come to
extricate me. The extrication of the garrisons was supposed to
affect our "National honour." If Earle succeeds, the "National
honour" thanks him, and I hope recommends him, but it is
altogether independent of me, who, for failing, incurs its blame.
I am not _the rescued lamb_, and I will not be."

Lord Wolseley, still possessed with the idea that, now that an
expedition had been sanctioned, the question of time was not of
supreme importance, and that the relieving expedition might be carried
out in a deliberate manner, which would be both more effective and
less exposed to risk, did not reach Cairo till September, and had only
arrived at Wady Halfa on 8th October, when his final instructions
reached him in the following form:--"The primary object of your
expedition is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, and
you are not to advance further south than necessary to attain that
object, and when it has been secured, no further offensive operations
of any kind are to be undertaken." These instructions were simple and
clear enough. The Government had not discovered a policy. It had,
however, determined to leave the garrisons to their fate, despite the
National honour being involved, at the very moment that it sanctioned
an enormous expenditure to try and save the lives of its
long-neglected representatives, Gordon and Colonel Stewart. With
extraordinary shrewdness, Gordon detected the hollowness of its
purpose, and wrote:--"I very much doubt what is really going to be the
policy of our Government, even now that the Expedition is at Dongola,"
and if they intend ratting out, "the troops had better not come beyond
Berber till the question of what will be done is settled."

The receipt of Gordon's and Power's despatches of July showed that
there were, at the time of their being written, supplies for four
months, which would hav