t, but, as the affair was managed, the last day of the
year 1884 was reached before there was even that small force ready to
make a dash across the desert for Metemmah.

The excuses made for this, as the result proved, fatal delay of taking
six weeks to do what--the forward movement from Dongola to Korti, not
of the main force, but of 1000 men--ought to have been done in one
week, were the dearth of camels, the imperfect drill of the camel
corps, and, it must be added, the exaggerated fear of the Mahdi's
power. When it was attempted to quicken the slow forward movement of
the unwieldy force confusion ensued, and no greater progress was
effected than if things had been left undisturbed. The erratic policy
in procuring camels caused them at the critical moment to be not
forthcoming in anything approaching the required numbers, and this
difficulty was undoubtedly increased by the treachery of Mahmoud
Khalifa, who was the chief contractor we employed. Even when the
camels were procured, they had to be broken in for regular work, and
the men accustomed to the strange drill and mode of locomotion. The
last reason perhaps had the most weight of all, for although the Mahdi
with all his hordes had been kept at bay by Gordon single-handed, Lord
Wolseley would risk nothing in the field. Probably the determining
reason for that decision was that the success of a small force would
have revealed how absolutely unnecessary his large and costly
expedition was. Yet events were to show beyond possibility of
contraversion that this was the case, for not less than two-thirds of
the force were never in any shape or form actively employed, and, as
far as the fate of Gordon went, might just as well have been left at
home. They had, however, to be fed and provided for at the end of a
line of communication of over 1200 miles.

Still, notwithstanding all these delays and disadvantages, a
well-equipped force of 1000 men was ready on 30th December to leave
Korti to cross the 170 miles of the Bayuda desert. That route was well
known and well watered. There were wells at, at least, five places,
and the best of these was at Jakdul, about half-way across. The
officer entrusted with the command was Major-General Sir Herbert
Stewart, an officer of a gallant disposition, who was above all others
impressed with the necessity of making an immediate advance, with the
view of throwing some help into Khartoum. Unfortunately he was
trammelled by his instruct