ions, which were to this effect--he was to
establish a fort at Jakdul; but if he found an insufficiency of water
there he was at liberty to press on to Metemmah. His action was to be
determined by the measure of his own necessities, not of Gordon's, and
so Lord Wolseley arranged throughout. He reached that place with his
1100 fighting men, but on examining the wells and finding them full,
he felt bound to obey the orders of his commander, viz. to establish
the fort, and then return to Korti for a reinforcement. It was a case
when Nelson's blind eye might have been called into requisition, but
even the most gallant officers are not Nelsons.

The first advance of General Stewart to Jakdul, reached on 3rd January
1885, was in every respect a success. It was achieved without loss,
unopposed, and was quite of the nature of a surprise. The British
relieving force was at last, after many months' report, proved to be
a reality, and although late, it was not too late. If General Stewart
had not been tied by his instructions, but left a free hand, he would
undoubtedly have pressed on, and a reinforcement of British troops
would have entered Khartoum even before the fall of Omdurman. But it
must be recorded also that Sir Herbert Stewart was not inspired by the
required flash of genius. He paid more deference to the orders of Lord
Wolseley than to the grave peril of General Gordon.

General Stewart returned to Korti on the 7th January, bringing with
him the tired camels, and he found that during his absence still more
urgent news had been received from Gordon, to the effect that if aid
did not come within ten days from the 14th December, the place might
fall, and that under the nose of the expedition. The native who
brought this intimation arrived at Korti the day after General Stewart
left, but a messenger could easily have caught him up and given him
orders to press on at all cost. It was not realised at the time, but
the neglect to give that order, and the rigid adherence to a
preconceived plan, proved fatal to the success of the whole
expedition.

The first advance of General Stewart had been in the nature of a
surprise, but it aroused the Mahdi to a sense of the position, and the
subsequent delay gave him a fortnight to complete his plans and assume
the offensive.

On 12th January--that is, nine days after his first arrival at
Jakdul--General Stewart reached the place a second time with the
second detachment of another 10