im, very inconsiderate and insubordinate of him to remain at his post
and to refuse all the hints given him, that he ought to resign unless
he would execute a _sauve qui peut_ sort of retreat to the frontier.
Very harsh things have been said of Mr Gladstone and his Cabinet on
this point, but considering their views and declarations, it is not so
very surprising that Gordon's boldness and originality alarmed and
displeased them. Their radical fault in these early stages of the
question was not that they were indifferent to Gordon's demands, but
that they had absolutely no policy. They could not even come to the
decision, as Gordon wrote, "to abandon altogether and not care what
happens."
But all these minor points were merged in a great common national
anxiety when month after month passed during the spring and summer of
1884, and not a single word issued from the tomb-like silence of
Khartoum. People might argue that the worst could not have happened,
as the Mahdi would have been only too anxious to proclaim his triumph
far and wide if Khartoum had fallen. Anxiety may be diminished, but is
not banished, by a calculation of probabilities, and the military
spirit and capacity exhibited by the Mahdi's forces under Osman Digma
in the fighting with General Graham's well-equipped British force at
Teb and Tamanieb revealed the greatness of the peril with which Gordon
had to deal at Khartoum where he had only the inadequate and
untrustworthy garrison described by Colonel de Coetlogon. During the
summer of 1884 there was therefore a growing fear, not only that the
worst news might come at any moment, but that in the most favourable
event any news would reveal the desperate situation to which Gordon
had been reduced, and with that conviction came the thought, not
whether he had exactly carried out what Ministers had expected him to
do, but solely of his extraordinary courage and devotion to his
country, which had led him to take up a thankless task without the
least regard for his comfort or advantage, and without counting the
odds. There was at least one Minister in the Cabinet who was struck by
that single-minded conduct; and as early as April, when his colleagues
were asking the formal question why Gordon did not leave Khartoum, the
Marquis of Hartington, then Minister of War, and now Duke of
Devonshire, began to inquire as to the steps necessary to rescue the
emissary, while still adhering to the policy of the Administration
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