ht yet provide some satisfactory issue from the dilemma, for
at the very beginning it was freely given out that "General Gordon
was exceeding his instructions."
The interruption of communications with Khartoum at least suspended
Gordon's constant representations as to what he thought the right
policy, as well as his demands for the fulfilment by the Government of
their side of the contract. It was then that Lord Granville seemed to
pluck up heart of grace, and to challenge Gordon's right to remain at
Khartoum. On 23rd April Lord Granville asked for explanation of "cause
of detention." Unfortunately it was not till months later that the
country knew of Gordon's terse and humorous reply, "cause of
detention, these horribly plucky Arabs." Lord Granville, thinking this
despatch not clear enough, followed it up on 17th May by instructing
Mr Egerton, then acting for Sir Evelyn Baring, to send the following
remonstrance to Gordon:
"As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has been
dropped, and as aggressive operations cannot be undertaken with
the countenance of H.M.'s Government, General Gordon is enjoined
to consider, and either to report upon, or, if possible, to adopt
at the first proper moment measures for his own removal and for
that of the Egyptians at Khartoum who have suffered for him, or
who have served him faithfully, including their wives and
children, by whatever route he may consider best, having especial
regard to his own safety and that of the other British subjects."
Then followed suggestions and authority to pay so much a head for
refugees safely escorted to Korosko. The comment Gordon made on that,
and similar despatches, to save himself and any part of the garrison
he could, was that he was not so mean as to desert those who had nobly
stood by him and committed themselves on the strength of his word.
It is impossible to go behind the collective responsibility of the
Government and to attempt to fix any special responsibility or blame
on any individual member of that Government. The facts as I read them
show plainly that there was a complete abnegation of policy or purpose
on the part of the British Government, that Gordon was then sent as a
sort of stop-gap, and that when it was revealed that he had strong
views and clear plans, not at all in harmony with those who sent him,
it was thought, by the Ministers who had not the courage to recall
h
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