doing nothing in their place towards the relief and
support of their representative, may have been the hope that this
treatment would have led him to resign and throw up his mission. They
would then have been able to declare that, as the task was beyond the
powers of General Gordon, they were only coming to the prudent and
logical conclusion in saying that nothing could be done, and that the
garrisons had better come to terms with the Mahdi. Unfortunately for
those who favoured the evasion of trouble as the easiest and best way
out of the difficulty, Gordon had high notions as to what duty
required. No difficulty had terrors for him, and while left at the
post of power and responsibility he would endeavour to show himself
equal to the charge.
Yet there can be no doubt that those who sent him would have rejoiced
if he had formally asked to be relieved of the task he had accepted,
and Mr Gladstone stated on the 3rd April that "Gordon was under no
orders and no restraint to stay at Khartoum." A significant answer to
the fact represented in that statement was supplied, when, ten days
later, silence fell on Khartoum, and remained unbroken for more than
five months. But at the very moment that the Prime Minister made that
statement as to Gordon's liberty of movement, the Government knew of
the candid views which he had expressed as to the proper policy for
the Soudan. It should have been apparent that, unless they and their
author were promptly repudiated, and unless the latter was stripped of
his official authority, the Government would, however tardily and
reluctantly, be drawn after its representative into a policy of
intervention in the Soudan, which it, above everything else,
wished to avoid. Gordon concealed nothing. He told them "time,"
"reinforcements," and a very considerable expenditure was necessary to
honourably carry out their policy of evacuation. They were not
prepared to concede any of these save the last, and even the money
they sent him was lost because they would send it by Berber instead of
Kassala. But they knew that "the order and restraint" which kept
Gordon at Khartoum was the duty he had contracted towards them when he
accepted his mission, and which was binding on a man of his principles
until they chose to relieve him of the task. The fear of public
opinion had more to do with their abstaining from the step of ordering
his recall than the hope that his splendid energy and administrative
power mig
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