told them that "the Mahdi must be smashed up," he went on to
say that "we cannot hurry over this affair" (the future of the Soudan)
"if we do we shall incur disaster," and again that, although "it is a
miserable country it is joined to Egypt, and it would be difficult to
divorce the two." Within a very few weeks, therefore, the Government
learnt that its own agent was the most forcible and damaging critic of
the policy of evacuation, and that the worries of the Soudan question
for an administration not resolute enough to solve the difficulty in a
thorough manner were increased and not diminished by Gordon's mission.
At that point the proposition was made and supported by several
members of the Cabinet that Gordon should be recalled. There is no
doubt that this step would have been taken but for the fear that it
would aggravate the difficulties of the English expedition sent to
Souakim under the command of General Gerald Graham to retrieve the
defeat of Baker Pasha. Failing the adoption of that extreme measure,
which would at least have been straightforward and honest, and
ignoring what candour seemed to demand if a decision had been come to
to render Gordon no support, and to bid him shift for himself, the
Government resorted to the third and least justifiable course of all,
viz. of showing indifference to the legitimate requests of their
emissary, and of putting off definite action until the very last
moment.

We have seen that Gordon made several specific demands in the first
six weeks of his stay at Khartoum--that is, in the short period before
communication was cut off. He wanted Zebehr, 200 troops at Berber, or
even at Wady Halfa, and the opening of the route from Souakim to the
Nile. To these requests not one favourable answer was given, and the
not wholly unnatural rejection of the first rendered it more than ever
necessary to comply with the others. They were such as ought to have
been granted, and in anticipation they had been suggested and
discussed before Gordon felt bound to urge them as necessary for the
security of his position at Khartoum. Even Sir Evelyn Baring had
recommended in February the despatch of 200 men to Assouan for the
moral effect, and that was the very reason why Gordon asked, in the
first place, for the despatch of a small British force to at least
Wady Halfa. It is possible that one of the chief reasons for the
Government rejecting all these suggestions, and also, it must be
remembered,