e that would have
proved inconvenient and damaging to her position and reputation.
Therefore the Government fell back on General Gordon, and the hope was
even indulged that, under his exceptional reputation, the evacuation
of the Soudan might not only be successfully carried out, but that his
success might induce the public and the world to accept that
abnegation of policy as the acme of wisdom. In all this they were
destined to a complete awakening, and the only matter of surprise is
that they should have sent so well-known a character as General
Gordon, whose independence and contempt for official etiquette and
restraint were no secrets at the Foreign and War Offices, on a mission
in which they required him not only to be as indifferent to the
national honour as they were, but also to be tied and restrained by
the shifts and requirements of an embarrassed executive.

At a very early stage of the mission the Government obtained evidence
that Gordon's views on the subject were widely different from theirs.
They had evidently persuaded themselves that their policy was Gordon's
policy; and before he was in Khartoum a week he not merely points out
that the evacuation policy is not his but theirs, and that although he
thinks its execution is still possible, the true policy is, "if Egypt
is to be quiet, that the Mahdi must be smashed up." The hopes that had
been based on Gordon's supposed complaisance in the post of
representative on the Nile of the Government policy were thus
dispelled, and it became evident that Gordon, instead of being a tool,
was resolved to be master, so far as the mode of carrying out the
evacuation policy with full regard for the dictates of honour was to
be decided. Nor was this all, or the worst of the revelations made to
the Government in the first few weeks after his arrival at Khartoum.
While expressing his willingness and intention to discharge the chief
part of his task, viz. the withdrawal of the garrisons, which was all
the Government cared about, he also descanted on the moral duty and
the inevitable necessity of setting up a provisional government that
should avert anarchy and impose some barrier to the Mahdi's progress.
All this was trying to those who only wished to be rid of the whole
matter, but Gordon did not spare their feelings, and phrase by phrase
he revealed what his own policy would be and what his inner wishes,
however repressed his charge might keep them, really were.

Having