r months (that is
end of November) river begins to fall; before that time you _must_
settle the Soudan question." So wrote the heroic defender of Khartoum
in words that could not be misunderstood, and those words were in the
hands of the British Ministers when half the period had expired. At
the same time Mr Power wrote: "We can at best hold out but two months
longer." Gordon at least never doubted what their effect would be, for
after what seemed to him a reasonable time had elapsed to enable this
message to reach its destination, he took the necessary steps to
recover Berber, and to send his steamers half-way to meet and assist
the advance of the reinforcement on which he thought from the
beginning he might surely rely.

On 10th September all his plans were completed, and Colonel Stewart,
accompanied by a strong force of Bashi-Bazouks and some black
soldiers, with Mr Power and M. Herbin, the French consul, sailed
northwards on five steamers. The first task of this expedition was if
possible, to retake Berber, or, failing that, to escort the _Abbas_
past the point of greatest danger; the second, to convey the most
recent news about Khartoum affairs to Lower Egypt; and the third was
to lend a helping hand to any force that might be coming up the Nile
or across the desert from the Red Sea. Five days after its departure
Gordon knew through a spy that Stewart's flotilla had passed Shendy in
safety, and had captured a valuable Arab convoy. It was not till
November that the truth was known how the ships bombarded Berber, and
passed that place not only in safety, but after causing the rebels
much loss and greater alarm, and then how Stewart and his European
companions went on in the small steamer _Abbas_ to bear the tale of
the wonderful defence of Khartoum to the outer world--a defence which,
wonderful as it was, really only reached the stage of the miraculous
after they had gone and had no further part in it. So far as Gordon's
military skill and prevision could arrange for their safety, he did
so, and with success. When the warships had to return he gave them the
best advice against treachery or ambuscade:--"Do not anchor near the
bank, do not collect wood at isolated spots, trust nobody." What more
could Gordon say? If they had paid strict heed to his advice, there
would have been no catastrophe at Dar Djumna. These reflections invest
with much force Gordon's own view of the matter:--"If _Abbas_ was
captured by treachery