during the first
few months the only characteristics of the Government policy.
At the same period all Gordon's telegrams and despatches showed that
he wanted reinforcements to some small extent, and at least military
demonstrations along his line of communication with Egypt to prove
that he possessed the support of his Government, and that he had only
to call upon it to send troops, and they were there to come. He,
naturally enough, treated as ridiculous the suggestion that he had
bound himself to do the whole work without any support; and fully
convinced that he had only to summon troops for them to be sent him in
the moderate strength he alone cared for, he issued a proclamation in
Khartoum, stating that "British troops are now on their way, and in a
few days will reach Khartoum." He therefore begged for the despatch of
a small force to Wady Halfa, and he went on to declare that it would
be "comparatively easy to destroy the Mahdi" if 200 British troops
were sent to Wady Halfa, and if the Souakim-Berber route were opened
up by Indian-Moslem troops. Failing the adoption of these measures, he
asked leave to raise a sum, by appealing to philanthropists,
sufficient to pay a small Turkish force and carry on a contest for
supremacy with the Mahdi on his own behoof. All these suggestions
were more or less supported by Sir Evelyn Baring, who at last
suggested in an important despatch, dated 28th February, that the
British Government should withdraw altogether from the matter, and
"give full liberty of action to General Gordon and the Khedive's
Government to do what seems best to them."
Well would it have been for Gordon and everyone whose reputation was
concerned if this step had been taken, for the Egyptian Government,
the Khedive, his ministers Nubar and Cherif, were opposed to all
surrender, and desired to hold on to Khartoum and the Souakim-Berber
route. But without the courage and resolution to discharge it, the
Government saw the obligation that lay on them to provide for the
security and good government of Egypt, and that if they shirked
responsibility in the Soudan, the independence of Egypt might be
accomplished by its own effort and success. They perceived the
objections to giving Egypt a free hand, but they none the less
abstained from taking the other course of definite and decisive action
on their own initiative. As Gordon quickly saw and tersely expressed:
"You will not let Egypt keep the Soudan, you will n
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