iews.
The instructions which the Government gave him were as follows, and I
quote the full text. They were probably not drawn up and in Gordon's
hands more than two hours before he left Charing Cross, and personally
I do not suppose that he had looked through them, much less studied
them. His view of the matter never varied. He went to the Soudan to
rescue the garrisons, and to carry out the evacuation of the province
after providing for its administration. The letter given in the
previous chapter shows how vague and incomplete was the agreement
between himself and Ministers. It was nothing more than the expression
of an idea that the Soudan should be evacuated, but how and under what
conditions was left altogether to the chapter of accidents. At the
start the Government's view of the matter and his presented no glaring
difference. They sent General Gordon to rescue and withdraw the
garrisons if he could do so, and they were also not averse to his
establishing any administration that he chose. But the main point on
which they laid stress was that they were to be no longer troubled in
the affair. Gordon's marvellous qualities were to extricate them from
the difficult position in which the shortcomings of the Egyptian
Government had placed them, and beyond that they had no definite
thought or care as to how the remedy was to be discovered and applied.
The following instructions should be read by the light of these
reflections, which show that, while they nominally started from the
same point, Gordon and the Government were never really in touch, and
had widely different goals in view:--

"FOREIGN OFFICE, _January 18th, 1884_.

"Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at
once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the
Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for
the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in
that country, and for the safety of the European population in
Khartoum.

"You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode
of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and
upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration
by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea-coast can best
be secured.

"In connection with this subject, you should pay especial
consideration to the question of the steps t