roperty being produced by time, is not any thing real in the
objects, but is the off-spring of the sentiments, on which alone time is
found to have any influence.
[Footnote 18. Present possession is plainly a relation
betwixt a person and an object; but is not sufficient to
counter-ballance the relation of first possession, unless
the former be long and uninterrupted: In which case the
relation is encreased on the side of the present possession,
by the extent of time, and dlminished on that of first
possession, by the distance, This change in the relation
produces a consequent change in the property.]
We acquire the property of objects by accession, when they
are connected in an intimate manner with objects that are
already our property, and at the same time are inferior to
them. Thus the fruits of our garden, the offspring of our
cattle, and the work of our slaves, are all of them esteemed
our property, even before possession. Where objects are
connected together in the imagination, they are apt to be
put on the same footing, and are commonly supposed to be
endowed with the same qualities. We readily pass from one to
the other, and make no difference in our judgments
concerning them; especially if the latter be inferior to the
former.
[Footnote 19. This source of property can never be
explained but from the imaginations; and one may affirm,
that the causes are here unmixed. We shall proceed to
explain them more particularly, and illustrate them by
examples from common life and experience.
It has been observed above, that the mind has a natural
propensity to join relations, especially resembling ones,
and finds a hind of fitness and uniformity in such an union.
From this propensity are derived these laws of nature, that
upon the first formation of society, property always follows
the present possession; and afterwards, that it arises from
first or from long possession. Now we may easily observe,
that relation is not confined merely to one degree; but that
from an object, that is related to us, we acquire a relation
to every other object, which is related to it, and so on,
till the thought loses the chain by too long a progress,
However the relation may weaken by each remove, it is not
immediately destroyed; but frequ
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