ld not be
sufficient to specify some lost battles in which the cavalry was on the
flanks and some gained in which the cavalry was in rear of the infantry;
and in the tatter of these cases it is not sufficient to refer to the
battles of Rivoli and Wagram, to the attack of the Austrians on the
theatre of war in Italy, in 1796, or of the French upon the German
theatre of war in the same year. The way in which these orders of battle
or plans of attack essentially contributed to disastrous issues in those
particular cases must be shown by closely tracing out circumstances and
occurrences. Then it will appear how far such forms or measures are to
be condemned, a point which it is very necessary to show, for a total
condemnation would be inconsistent with truth.

It has been already said that when a circumstantial detail of facts is
impossible, the demonstrative power which is deficient may to a certain
extent be supplied by the number of cases quoted; but this is a very
dangerous method of getting out of the difficulty, and one which has
been much abused. Instead of one well-explained example, three or four
are just touched upon, and thus a show is made of strong evidence. But
there are matters where a whole dozen of cases brought forward would
prove nothing, if, for instance, they are facts of frequent occurrence,
and therefore a dozen other cases with an opposite result might just as
easily be brought forward. If any one will instance a dozen lost battles
in which the side beaten attacked in separate converging columns, we
can instance a dozen that have been gained in which the same order was
adopted. It is evident that in this way no result is to be obtained.

Upon carefully considering these different points, it will be seen how
easily examples may be misapplied.

An occurrence which, instead of being carefully analysed in all its
parts, is superficially noticed, is like an object seen at a great
distance, presenting the same appearance on each side, and in which the
details of its parts cannot be distinguished. Such examples have, in
reality, served to support the most contradictory opinions. To some
Daun's campaigns are models of prudence and skill. To others, they are
nothing but examples of timidity and want of resolution. Buonaparte's
passage across the Noric Alps in 1797 may be made to appear the noblest
resolution, but also as an act of sheer temerity. His strategic defeat
in 1812 may be represented as the conseq