use. This is to
know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God
knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.
Obj. 2: Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine
essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence.
But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as
said above (Q. 12, A. 2). Therefore neither can the created essence
be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His
essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its
essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper
knowledge of it.
Obj. 3: Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through
its proper ratio [i.e., concept]. But as God knows all things by His
essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper
ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse
things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a
general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper
ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.
_On the contrary,_ To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them
not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God
knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even
to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the
marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart;
neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Heb. 4:12,13).
_I answer that,_ Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows
things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings.
For as fire, if it knew itself as the principle of heat, would know
the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so
God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the
nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.
But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in
particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect,
when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a
universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in
particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is
clear from _Phys._ i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things
other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow
that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; t
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