t prevent the origin of one from
another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect
things.
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 8]
Whether All the Powers Remain in the Soul When Separated from the
Body?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in
the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book _De Spiritu
et Anima_ that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself
sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and
irascibility."
Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties.
But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never
separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even
after death.
Obj. 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not
weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says
(De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he
would see even as well as a young man." But weakness is the road to
corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when
the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.
Obj. 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the
Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the
separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in
hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy
lifetime" (Luke 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated
soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.
Obj. 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which
is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls
grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive.
Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.
Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the
soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some
things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite
separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the
sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in
the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two
substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the
body with its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive
powers do not remain.
_I answer that,_ As w
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