t reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyapti
(concomitance of _hetu_ (reason) and _sadhya_ (probandum)) which became
so important in later Nyaya has never been properly formulated
either in the _Nyaya sutras_ or in the Vais'e@sika. _Vais'e@sika
sutra_, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance
between hetu and sadhya (_prasiddhipurvakatvat apades'asya_),

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[Footnote 1: _J.A.S.B._ 1905.]

304

but the technical vyapti is not known, and the connotation of
the term _prasiddhipurvakatva_ of Vais'e@sika seems to be more
loose than the term _vyapti_ as we know it in the later Nyaya. The
_Vais'e@sika sutras_ do not count scriptures (_s'abda_) as a separate
prama@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas.
With _Nyaya sutras_ s'abda as a prama@na applies not only to the
Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and
Vatsyayana says that trustworthy persons may be of three
kinds _@r@si, arya_ and _mleccha_ (foreigners). Upamana which is
regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyaya is not even
referred to in the _Vais'e@sika sutras_. The _Nyaya sutras_ know of
other prama@nas, such as _arthapatti, sambhava_ and _aitihya_, but
include them within the prama@nas admitted by them, but the
_Vais'e@sika sutras_ do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1]. The
_Vais'e@sika sutras_ believe in the perception of negation (abhava) through
the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i.
1-10). The _Nyaya sutras_ (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhava as
non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another
to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks
are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that
absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2]. Though
there is thus an agreement between the Nyaya and the _Vais'e@sika
sutras_ about the acceptance of abhava as being due to perception,
yet their method of handling the matter is different. The _Nyaya
sutras_ say nothing about the categories of _dravya, gu@na, karma,
vis'e@sa_ and _samavaya_ which form the main subjects of Vais'e@ska
discussions [Footnote ref 3]. The _Nyaya sutras_ take much pains to prove
the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have
been important with Vais'e@sika. The slight reference to this
question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be r