, the Carvaka,
and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Like Vais'e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold division
of inference (_anumana_) as _purvavat, s'e@savat and samanyatod@r@s@ta_.]

303

further allusion elsewhere. The _Vais'e@sika sutras_ as we have already
seen had argued only against the Mima@msa, and ultimately agreed
with them on most points. The dispute with Mima@msa in the
_Nyaya sutras_ is the same as in the Vais'e@sika over the question
of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the
self-validity of knowledge (_svata@h prama@nyavada_)and the akhyati
doctrine of illusion of the Mima@msists, which form the two chief
points of discussion between later Mima@msa and later Nyaya,
are never alluded to in the _Nyaya sutras_. The advocacy of Yoga
methods (_Nyaya sutras_, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be
an alien element; these are not found in Vais'e@sika and are not in
keeping with the general tendency of the _Nyaya sutras_, and the
Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahamahopadhyaya
Haraprasada S'astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.

The _Vais'e@sika sutras_, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional
knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the
self (atman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they
also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived
under special conditions of sa@mskara (conglomeration etc.).
The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity
(_ayaugapadya_) of knowledge and efforts is almost
the same with Vais'e@sika as with Nyaya. The _Nyaya sutras_
give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring
in the questions of sa@mskara or udbhutarupavattva which Vais'e@sika
does. On the question of inference Nyaya gives three
classifications as purvavat, s'e@savat and samanyatod@r@s@ta, but no
definition. The _Vais'e@sika sutras_ do not know of these classifications,
and give only particular types or instances of inference
(V.S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made
when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation
of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind
of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and
so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference
withou