ls (_vyakti_), and the specific
position of the limbs (_ak@rti_), by which the class notion is manifested.
Class (_jati_} is defined as that which produces the notion
of sameness (_samanaprasavatmika jati@h_).
The third book begins with the proofs for the existence of
the self or atman. It is said that each of the senses is associated
with its own specific object, but there must exist some other entity
in us which gathered together the different sense-cognitions and
produced the perception of the total object as distinguished from
the separate sense-perceptions. If there were no self then there
would be no sin in injuring the bodies of men: again if there
were no permanent self, no one would be able to recognize
things as having seen them before; the two images produced by
the eyes in visual perception could not also have been united
together as one visual perception of the things [Footnote ref 1]; moreover
if there were no permanent cognizer then by the sight of a sour
fruit one could not be reminded of its sour taste. If consciousness
belonged to the senses only, then there would be no recognition,
for the experience of one could not be recognized by another.
If it is said that the unity of sensations could as well be effected
by manas (mind), then the manas would serve the same purpose
as self and it would only be a quarrel over a name, for this
entity the knower would require some instrument by which it
would co-ordinate the sensations and cognize; unless manas is
admitted as a separate instrument of the soul, then though the
sense perceptions could be explained as being the work of the
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[Footnote 1: According to Vatsyayana, in the two eyes we have two different
senses. Udyotakara, however, thinks that there is one visual sense which
works in both eyes.]
299
senses, yet imagining, thinking, etc., could not be explained.
Another argument for the admission of soul is this, that infants
show signs of pleasure and pain in quite early stages of infancy
and this could not be due to anything but similar experiences in
previous lives. Moreover every creature is born with some desires,
and no one is seen to be born without desires. All attachments
and desires are due to previous experiences, and therefore it is
argued that desires in infants are due to their experience in
previous existences.
The body is made up of the k@siti element. The visual
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