tor would refute all
means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any
means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that there are no
means of valid knowledge at all. Just as from the diverse kinds
of sounds of different musical instruments, one can infer the previous
existence of those different kinds of musical instruments,
so from our knowledge of objects we can infer the previous existence
of those objects of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].

The same things (e.g. the senses, etc.) which are regarded as
instruments of right knowledge with reference to the right cognition
of other things may themselves be the objects of right

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[Footnote 1: _Yathapas'catsiddhena s'abdena purvasiddham atodyamanumiyate
sadhyam ca atodyam sadhanam ca s'abda@h antarhite hyatodye svanata@h
anumanam bhavatiti, vi@na vadyate ve@nu@h puryyate iti svanavis'e@se@na
atodyavis'e@sam pratipadyate tatha purvasiddham upalabdhivi@sayam
pas'catsiddhena upalabdhihetuna pratipadyate. Vatsyayana bha@sya,_ II.
i. 15.]

297

knowledge. There are no hard and fast limits that those which
are instruments of knowledge should always be treated as mere
instruments, for they themselves may be objects of right knowledge.
The means of right knowledge (prama@na) do not require
other sets of means for revealing them, for they like the light of
a lamp in revealing the objects of right knowledge reveal themselves
as well.

Coming to the question of the correctness of the definition
of perception, it is held that the definition includes the contact
of the soul with the mind [Footnote ref 1]. Then it is said that though we
perceive only parts of things, yet since there is a whole, the perception
of the part will naturally refer to the whole. Since we
can pull and draw things wholes exist, and the whole is not
merely the parts collected together, for were it so one could
say that we perceived the ultimate parts or the atoms [Footnote ref 2].
Some objectors hold that since there may be a plurality of causes it is
wrong to infer particular causes from particular effects. To this
the Nyaya answer is that there is always such a difference in the
specific nature of each effect that if properly observed each particular
effect will lead us to a correct inference of its own particular
cause [Footnote ref 3]. In refuting those who object to the existence of
time on the ground of relativity, it is