only
when there is contact between the self, the senses and the objects
proves that there is manas (mind), and this manas is a substance
and eternal, and this can be proved because there is no simultaneity
of production of efforts and various kinds of cognition; it
may also be inferred that this manas is one (with each person).
The soul may be inferred from inhalation, exhalation, twinkling
of the eye, life, the movement of the mind, the sense-affections
pleasure, pain, will, antipathy, and effort. That it is a substance
and eternal can be proved after the manner of vayu. An objector
is supposed to say that since when I see a man I do not see his
soul, the inference of the soul is of the type of _samanyatod@r@s@ta_
inference, i.e., from the perceived signs of pleasure, pain, cognition
to infer an unknown entity to which they belong, but
that this was the self could not be affirmed. So the existence of
soul has to be admitted on the strength of the scriptures. But
the Vais'e@sika reply is that since there is nothing else but self to
which the expression "I" may be applied, there is no need of
falling back on the scriptures for the existence of the soul. But
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[Footnote 1: In connection with this there is a short reference to the
methods of fallacy in which Gautama's terminology does not appear.
There is no generalised statement, but specific types of inference
are only pointed out as the basis.]
[Footnote 2: The forms of inference used show that Ka@nada was probably not
aware of Gautama's terminology.]
290
then it is said that if the self is directly perceived in such experiences
as "I am Yajnadatta" or "I am Devadatta," what is the
good of turning to inference? The reply to this is that inference
lending its aid to the same existence only strengthens the conviction.
When we say that Devadatta goes or Yajnadatta goes,
there comes the doubt whether by Devadatta or Yajnadatta the
body alone is meant; but the doubt is removed when we think
that the notion of "I" refers to the self and not to anything else.
As there is no difference regarding the production of pleasure,
pain, and cognition, the soul is one in all. But yet it is many
by special limitations as individuals and this is also proved on
the strength of the scriptures [Footnote ref 1].
In the first chapter of the fourth book it is said that that
which is existent, but yet has no cause,
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