ing that we first perceive empty space and then
become aware of its parts by dividing it. Parts of space are
essentially limitations of the one space; therefore to apprehend them
we must first apprehend space. And since space is _one_, it must be
object of perception; in other words, space, in the sense of the one
all-embracing space, i. e. the totality of individual spaces, is
something perceived.

The argument appears open to two objections. In the _first_ place, we
do _not_ perceive space as a whole, and then, by dividing it, come to
apprehend individual spaces. We perceive individual spaces, or,
rather, individual bodies occupying individual spaces.[23] We then
apprehend that these spaces, as spaces, involve an infinity of other
spaces. In other words, it is reflection on the general nature of
space, the apprehension of which is involved in our apprehension of
individual spaces or rather of bodies in space, which gives rise to
the apprehension of the totality[24] of spaces, the apprehension being
an act, not of perception, but of thought or conception. It is
necessary, then, to distinguish (_a_) individual spaces, which we
perceive; (_b_) the nature of space in general, of which we become
aware by reflecting upon the character of perceived individual spaces,
and which we conceive; (_c_) the totality of individual spaces, the
thought of which we reach by considering the nature of space in
general.

[23] This contention is not refuted by the objection that our
distinct apprehension of an individual space is always bound
up with an indistinct apprehension of the spaces immediately
surrounding it. For our indistinct apprehension cannot be
supposed to be of the whole of the surrounding space.

[24] It is here assumed that a whole or a totality can be
infinite. Cf. p. 102.

In the _second_ place, the distinctions just drawn afford no ground
for distinguishing space as something perceived from any other
characteristic of objects as something conceived; for any other
characteristic admits of corresponding distinctions. Thus, with
respect to colour it is possible to distinguish (_a_) individual
colours which we perceive; (_b_) colouredness in general, which we
conceive by reflecting on the common character exhibited by individual
colours and which involves various kinds or species of colouredness;
(_c_) the totality of individual colours, the thought of which is
reached by considering the na