are conceived. For the distinction between
universal and individual is quite general, and applies to all
characteristics of objects alike. Thus, in the case of colour, we can
distinguish colour in general and the individual colours of individual
objects; or, to take a less ambiguous instance, we can distinguish a
particular shade of redness and its individual instances. Further, it
may be said that perception is of the individual shade of red of the
individual object, and that the faculty by which we become explicitly
aware of the particular shade of red in general is that of conception.
The same distinction can be drawn with respect to hardness, or shape,
or any other characteristic of objects. The distinction, then,
between perception and conception can be drawn with respect to any
characteristic of objects, and does not serve to distinguish one from
another.

[19] And _not_ as mutually involved in the apprehension
of any individual reality.

[20] This distinction is of course different to that
previously drawn _within_ perception in the full sense
between perception in a narrow sense and conception
(pp. 28-9).

Kant's arguments to show that our apprehension of space belongs to
perception are two in number, and both are directed to show not, as
they should, that space is a _form_ of perception, but that it is a
_perception_.[21] The first runs thus: "Space is no discursive, or, as
we say, general conception of relations of things in general, but a
pure perception. For, in the first place, we can represent to
ourselves only one space, and if we speak of many spaces we mean
thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Again, these
parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space as the component
parts, as it were, out of which it can be composed, but can be thought
only in it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and
consequently the general conception of spaces in general, rests solely
upon limitations."[22]

[21] Kant uses the phrase 'pure perception'; but 'pure' can
only mean 'not containing sensation', and consequently adds
nothing relevant.

[22] B. 39, M. 24. The concluding sentences of the paragraph
need not be considered.

Here Kant is clearly taking the proper test of perception. Its object,
as being an individual, is unique; there is only one of it, whereas
any conception has a plurality of instances. But he reaches his
conclusion by suppos