ual object of the senses or a sensation, as a mere form
of sensibility." Here Kant has passed, without any consciousness of a
transition, from treating space as that in which the manifold of
sensation is arranged to treating it as a capacity of perceiving.
Moreover, since Kant in this passage speaks of space as a perception,
and thereby identifies space with the perception of it,[12] the
confusion may be explained thus. The form of phenomena is said to be
the space in which all sensations are arranged, or in which all bodies
are; space, apart from all sensations or bodies, i. e. empty, being
the object of a pure perception, is treated as identical with a pure
perception, viz. the perception of empty space; and the perception of
empty space is treated as identical with a capacity of perceiving that
which is spatial.[13]

[4] 'Corresponds to' must mean 'is'.

[5] B. 34, M. 21.

[6] Cf. pp. 30-2.

[7] It is impossible, of course, to see how such a process
can give us knowledge of the spatial world, for, whatever
bodies in space are, they are not arrangements of sensations.
Nevertheless, Kant's theory of perception really precludes
him from holding that bodies are anything else than
arrangements of sensations, and he seems at times to accept
this view explicitly, e. g. B. 38, M. 23 (quoted p. 41),
where he speaks of our representing sensations as external
to and next to each other, and, therefore, as in different
places.

[8] It may be noted that it would have been more natural to
describe the particular shape of the phenomenon (i. e. the
particular spatial arrangement of the sensations) rather than
space as the form of the phenomenon; for the matter to which
the form is opposed is said to be sensation, and that of
which it is the matter is said to be the phenomenon, i. e.
a body in space.

[9] Cf. note 4, p. 38.

[10] Cf. _Prol._ Sec. 11 and p. 137.

[11] Cf. p. 41, note 1.

[12] Cf. p. 51, note 1.

[13] The same confusion (and due to the same cause) is
implied _Prol_. Sec. 11, and B. 42 (b), M. 26 (b) first
paragraph. Cf. B. 49 (b), M. 30 (b).

The existence of the confusion, however, is most easily realized by
asking, 'How did Kant come to think of space and time as the _only_
forms of perception?' It would seem obvious that the perception of
_anything_ implies a form of perception in the sense of