ond case there is a whole which
differs both logically and psychologically from the first whole; and I
urge that in contributing to the change the terms so far are altered."
Not merely the relations, then, but the terms are altered: _und zwar_ 'so
far.' But just _how_ far is the whole problem; and 'through-and-through'
would seem (in spite of Mr. Bradley's somewhat undecided utterances[58])
to be the full Bradleyan answer. The 'whole' which he here treats as
primary and determinative of each part's manner of 'contributing,' simply
_must_, when it alters, alter in its entirety. There _must_ be total
conflux of its parts, each into and through each other. The 'must' appears
here as a _Machtspruch_, as an _ipse dixit_ of Mr. Bradley's
absolutistically tempered 'understanding,' for he candidly confesses that
how the parts _do_ differ as they contribute to different wholes, is
unknown to him.[59]
Although I have every wish to comprehend the authority by which Mr.
Bradley's understanding speaks, his words leave me wholly unconverted.
'External relations' stand with their withers all unwrung, and remain,
for aught he proves to the contrary, not only practically workable, but
also perfectly intelligible factors of reality.
VI
Mr. Bradley's understanding shows the most extraordinary power of
perceiving separations and the most extraordinary impotence in
comprehending conjunctions. One would naturally say 'neither or both,'
but not so Mr. Bradley. When a common man analyzes certain _whats_ from
out the stream of experience, he understands their distinctness _as thus
isolated_. But this does not prevent him from equally well understanding
their combination with each other _as originally experienced in the
concrete_, or their confluence with new sensible experiences in which
they recur as 'the same.' Returning into the stream of sensible
presentation, nouns and adjectives, and _thats_ and abstract _whats_,
grow confluent again, and the word 'is' names all these experiences of
conjunction. Mr. Bradley understands the isolation of the abstracts, but
to understand the combination is to him impossible.[60] "To understand
a complex _AB_," he says, "I must begin with _A_ or _B_. And beginning,
say with _A_, if I then merely find _B_, I have either lost _A_, or I
have got beside _A_, [_the word 'beside' seems here vital, as meaning a
conjunction 'external' and therefore unintelligible_] something else,
and in neither case have I
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