mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God, and
therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that thing,
we say nothing else than that God has this or that idea; not indeed in
so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is manifested through the
nature of the human mind, or in so far as He forms the essence of the
human mind; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not merely
in so far as He forms the nature of the human mind, but in so far as He
has at the same time with the human mind the idea also of another thing,
then we say that the human mind perceives the thing partially or
inadequately.

... When you ask me my opinion on the question[17] raised concerning
our knowledge of the means, whereby each part of Nature agrees with its
whole, and the manner in which it is associated with the remaining
parts, I presume you are asking for the reasons which induce us to
believe that each part of Nature agrees with its whole, and is
associated with the remaining parts. For as to the means whereby the
parts are really associated, and each part agrees with its whole, I told
you in my former letter that I am in ignorance. To answer such a
question we should have to know the whole of Nature and its several
parts. I will therefore endeavor to show the reason which led me to make
the statement; but I will promise that I do not attribute to Nature
either beauty or deformity, order or confusion. Only in relation to our
imagination can things be called beautiful or deformed, ordered or
confused.

By the association of parts, then, I merely mean that the laws or nature
of one part adapt themselves to the laws or nature of another part, so
as to cause the least possible inconsistency. As to the whole and the
parts, I mean that a given number of things are parts of a whole, in so
far as the nature of each of them is adapted to the nature of the rest
so that they all, as far as possible, agree together. On the other hand,
in so far as they do not agree, each of them forms, in our minds, a
separate idea, and is to that extent considered as a whole, not as a
part. For instance, when the parts of lymph, chyle, etc., combine,
according to the proportion of the figure and size of each, so as to
evidently unite, and form one fluid, the chyle, lymph, etc., considered
under this aspect, are part of the blood; but, in so far as we consider
the particles of lymph as differing in figure and size from the
particles o