only of mover and moved.
Reply Obj. 3: Impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise
than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the
directing reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the
other hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural
instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the
unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid.
Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do
not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not
command.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 3]
Whether Use Precedes Command?
Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes command. For command is
an act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above
(A. 1). But, as we have already shown (Q. 16, A. 1), use is an act of
the will. Therefore use precedes command.
Obj. 2: Further, command is one of those things that are ordained to
the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the end.
Therefore it seems that use precedes command.
Obj. 3: Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called
use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q. 16,
A. 1). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as
stated above (A. 1). Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the
common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse
to action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command.
Therefore command precedes use.
_I answer that,_ use of that which is directed to the end, in so far
as it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as
stated above (Q. 16, A. 4). Wherefore still more does it precede
command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end,
in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command;
because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for
one does not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But
command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the
command is given: for it naturally precedes its fulfilment,
sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Consequently it is evident
that command precedes use.
Reply Obj. 1: Not every act of the will precedes this act of the
reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz.
choice; and an act of
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