ut by intimating
and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.

Reply Obj. 2: The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof;
but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely
towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have
various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will
as being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason
is the root of liberty.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that command is an act of reason
not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 2]

Whether Command Belongs to Irrational Animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that command belongs to irrational
animals. Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands
movement is the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in
the muscles and nerves." But both powers are in irrational animals.
Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.

Obj. 2: Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives
commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to his
master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is
commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are
composed of soul and body.

Obj. 3: Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action.
But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be
found in irrational animals.

_On the contrary,_ Command is an act of reason, as stated above (A.
1). But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore,
is there command.

_I answer that,_ To command is nothing else than to direct someone to
do something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the
proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational
animals should command in any way, since they are devoid of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The appetitive power is said to command movement, in so
far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man. In
irrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a
commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion.

Reply Obj. 2: The body of the irrational animal is competent to obey;
but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent
to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander and
commanded; but