touch the stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the
stick. But irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive
movement; for this is in them through natural instinct. Hence in the
irrational animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but
it does not apply that movement to some particular thing. And hence
it is that the irrational animal is not properly said to consent:
this is proper to the rational nature, which has the command of the
appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this
or that thing.

Reply Obj. 1: In irrational animals the determination of the appetite
to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent implies a
determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely
passive.

Reply Obj. 2: If the first be removed, then what follows is removed,
provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only. But if
something can follow from several things, it is not removed by the
fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect of
heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen
water is hardened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not
follow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an act
follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the
appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.

Reply Obj. 3: The man who acts through passion is able not to follow
the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power. Hence
the comparison fails.
________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 3]

Whether Consent Is Directed to the End or to the Means?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent is directed to the end.
Because that on account of which a thing is such is still more such.
But it is on account of the end that we consent to the means.
Therefore, still more do we consent to the end.

Obj. 2: Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as
the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man
consents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.

Obj. 3: Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above (Q.
13, A. 1). If therefore consent were only directed to the means it
would nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be false by
the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
"after the approval" which he calls "the sentence," "comes the
choice." Therefore consent is not on