Reply Obj. 2: Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive
faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies seeking
acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: _Assentire_ (to assent) is, to speak, _ad aliud
sentire_ (to feel towards something); and thus it implies a certain
distance from that to which assent is given. But _consentire_ (to
consent) is "to feel with," and this implies a certain union to the
object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the
thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the
intellect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards the
thing, but rather the reverse, as we have stated in the First Part
(Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 4; Q. 59, A. 2), is more properly said to
assent: although one word is wont to be used for the other [*In Latin
rather than in English.]. We may also say that the intellect assents,
in so far as it is moved by the will.
________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 2]

Whether Consent Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational
animals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one
thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one
thing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational animals.

Obj. 2: Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what
follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore
there were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act
accomplished; which is clearly false.

Obj. 3: Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do something,
through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But irrational
animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after
judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling,
and this is called the sentence," i.e. consent. But counsel is not in
irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.

_I answer that,_ Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational
animals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of
the appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the
appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to the subject
in whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is
an action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so that it