that sense in which the reason includes the will, as stated
above (A. 1, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 1: Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the
higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to
delight in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower
reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises
judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an
action; and in like manner on the delight that results. But in so far
as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it
belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something
else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it
is ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called
the master or principal art.

Reply Obj. 2: Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that
we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of each
power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above (A. 1,
ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.

Reply Obj. 3: The higher reason is said to consent not only because
it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but also
because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.
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QUESTION 16

OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether use is an act of the will?

(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?

(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?

(4) Of the relation of use to choice.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 1]

Whether Use Is an Act of the Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that use is not an act of the will. For
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that "to use is to refer that
which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else." But
"to refer" something to another is an act of the reason to which it
belongs to compare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the
reason and not of the will.

Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that man "goes
forward to the operation, and this is called impulse; then he makes
use (of the powers) and this is called use." But operation belongs to
the executive power; and the act of the will does not follow the act
of the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last.
Theref