n such and such an end. Therefore the
inquiry of counsel should begin from things present.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who
takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze."

_I answer that,_ In every inquiry one must begin from some principle.
And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the
process is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause
to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple
than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the
order of being, the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment
deals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple
causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which
precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution.
Hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning
that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and
continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.

Reply Obj. 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their
reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about
actions is contrary to the order of actions.

Reply Obj. 2: Reason begins with that which is first according to
reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.

Reply Obj. 3: We should not want to know whether something to be done
for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that end.
Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end,
before considering whether it be possible.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 6]

Whether the Process of Counsel Is Indefinite?

Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite.
For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which
action is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the
process of counsel is indefinite.

Obj. 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what
is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action can
be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason.
Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.

Obj. 3: Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on
indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are
self-evident, which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty
is not to be had in contingent singulars, which are v