be that of offensive action. It will be
seen, with particular reference to the latter, that the character of
the front of operations prescribed the offensive in great and
concentrated force toward the St. Lawrence, with preparations and
demonstrations framed to keep the enemy doubtful to the last possible
moment as to where the blow should fall; while on the western
frontier, from Michilimackinac to Niagara, the defensive should have
been maintained, qualifying this term, however, by the already quoted
maxim of Napoleon, that no offensive disposition is complete which
does not keep in view, and provide for, offensive action, if
opportunity offer. Such readiness, if it leads to no more, at least
compels the opponent to retain near by a degree of force that weakens
by so much his resistance in the other quarter, against which the real
offensive campaign is directed.

Similarly, the seaboard, defensive in general relation to the national
plan as a whole, must have its own particular sphere of offensive
action, without which its defensive function is enfeebled, if not
paralyzed. Having failed to create before the war a competent navy,
capable of seizing opportunity, when offered, to act against hostile
divisions throughout the world, it was not possible afterwards to
retrieve this mistake. Under the circumstances existing in 1812, the
previous decade having been allowed by the country to pass in absolute
naval indifference, offensive measures were necessarily confined to
the injury of the enemy's commerce. Had a proper force existed,
abundant opportunity for more military action was sure to occur. The
characteristics of parts of the American coast prevented close
blockade, especially in winter; and the same violent winds which
forced an enemy's ships off, facilitated egress under circumstances
favoring evasion. Escape to the illimitable ocean then depended at
worst upon speed. This was the case at Boston, which Commodore
Bainbridge before the war predicted could not be effectually
blockaded; also at Narragansett, recommended for the same reason by
Commodore John Rodgers; and in measure at New York, though there the
more difficult and shoaler bar involved danger and delay to the
passage of heavy frigates. In this respect the British encountered
conditions contrary to those they had know before the French Atlantic
ports, where the wind which drove the blockaders off prevented the
blockaded from leaving. Once out and away, a