ably large additions. For some
philosophies such an idea is impossible. (See Bradley, _Appearance and
Reality_, p. 502. "The universe is incapable of increase. And to suppose
a constant supply of new souls, none of which ever perished, would
clearly land us in the end in an insuperable difficulty.") But even if
we do not admit that it is impossible, it at least destroys all analogy
between the material and spiritual worlds. If all the bodies that ever
lived continued to exist separately after death, the congestion would be
unthinkable. Is a corresponding congestion in the spiritual world really
thinkable?]
[Footnote 36: This seems to be the view of the Chandogya Up. VI. 12. As
the whole world is a manifestation ol Brahman, so is the great banyan
tree a manifestation of the subtle essence which is also present in its
minute seeds.]
[Footnote 37: The Brihad Ar. Up. knows of samsara and karma but as
matters of deep philosophy and not for the vulgar: but in the Buddhist
Pitakas they are assumed as universally accepted. The doctrine must
therefore have been popularized after the composition of the Upanishad.
But some allowance must be made for the fact that the Upanishads and the
earliest versions of the Buddhist Suttas were produced in different
parts of India.]
[Footnote 38: Yet many instances are quoted from Celtic and Teutonic
folklore to the effect that birds and butterflies are human souls, and
Caesar's remarks about the Druids may not be wholly wrong.]
[Footnote 39: Several other Europeans of eminence have let their minds
play with the ideas of metempsychosis, pre-existence and karma, as for
instance Giordano Bruno, Swedenborg, Goethe, Lessing, Lavater, Herder,
Schopenhauer, Ibsen, von Helmont, Lichtenberg and in England such
different spirits as Hume and Wordsworth. It would appear that towards
the end of the eighteenth century these ideas were popular in some
literary circles on the continent. See Bertholet, _The Transmigration of
Souls_, pp. 111 ff. Recently Professor McTaggart has argued in favour of
the doctrine with great lucidity and persuasiveness. Huxley too did not
think it absurd. See his _Romanes Lecture, Evolution and Ethics,
Collected Essays_, vol. IX. p. 61. As Deussen observes, Kant's argument
which bases immortality on the realization of the moral law, attainable
only by an infinite process of approximation, points to transmigration
rather than immortality in the usual sense.]
[Footnote 40:
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