oyers--of the attack; and
the first step was to reduce the number of convoys and to increase
correspondingly the number of ships in each convoy. A telegram was sent
to the Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands on October 26 asking
whether the convoys could be conveniently reduced to three per week. A
reply was received on the 29th to the effect that the convoy could be
run every third day under certain conditions; the important conditions
were the use of the Tyne instead of the Hurnber as a collecting port,
and the provision of eight extra trawlers and nine modern destroyers.
Sir Frederick Brock stated that he was assuming cruiser protection to
the convoys and that the details would need to be worked out before the
change could be made. He suggested a conference. He was requested on
October 31 to consult the Vice-Admiral Commanding East Coast of England
as to the practicability of using the Tyne as a convoy collecting port.
Meanwhile Sir F. Brock had prepared a scheme for giving effect to his
proposals, and on November 5 he sent copies of this scheme to the
Vice-Admiral Commanding East Coast of England and other officers
concerned for their consideration.

In forwarding proposals to the Admiralty on November 22, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet stated that the destroyers asked
for could not be provided from the Grand Fleet. Amongst other reasons it
was pointed out that the destroyers required for screening the light
cruisers protecting the convoys would have to be supplied from that
source, thus bringing an additional strain on the Grand Fleet flotillas.
He suggested the provision of these vessels from other Commands, such as
the Mediterranean, and pointed out the manifest advantages that would
result from providing a force for this convoy work that would be
additional to the Grand Fleet flotillas. Consideration of the proposals
at the Admiralty showed once again the great difficulty of providing the
destroyers. It was impossible to spare any from the Mediterranean, where
large troop movements needing destroyer protection were in progress, and
other Commands were equally unable to furnish them. Indeed, the demands
for destroyers from all directions were as insistent as ever. The
unsuitability of the Tyne as a collecting port was remarked upon by the
Naval Staff, as well as other objections to the scheme as put forward
from Scapa. In order to decide upon a workable scheme, directions were
given that a con