rose
during the year 1917 owing to the success attending the attacks by enemy
submarines on oil tankers bringing oil fuel to the United Kingdom for
the use of the Fleet. A great many of these tank vessels were of great
length and slow speed and presented the easiest of targets to the
torpedo attack of a submerged submarine. So many vessels were sunk that
our reserve of oil fuel became perilously low. Instead of a reserve of
some five or six months we were gradually reduced to one of about eight
weeks, and in order to economize expenditure of fuel it actually became
necessary at one time to issue directions that the speed of oil-burning
warships was to be limited except in cases of the greatest urgency. Such
an order in war was a matter of much gravity; the great majority of our
light cruisers and destroyers were fitted to burn oil fuel only, as well
as our latest and most powerful battleships. The crisis was eventually
overcome by drawing upon every source (including the Grand Fleet) for
destroyers to escort the tankers through the submarine danger areas, and
by the assistance given us by the Ministry of Shipping in bringing
supplies of oil fuel to this country in the double bottoms of merchant
ships. By the end of 1917 the situation had greatly improved.

The losses of shipping during 1917 were particularly heavy in the
Mediterranean. Apart from the fact that the narrow waters of that sea
render difficult a policy of evasion on the part of merchant shipping
and give great advantages to the submarine, it was thought that the
heavy losses in the early part of the year were partly due to the method
of routeing the ships then in force, and in reply to representations
made to the French Admiralty this system was altered by the French
Commander-in-Chief. It should be noted that the Mediterranean outside
the Adriatic was under French naval control in accordance with the
agreement entered into with France and Italy. The cordial co-operation
of the French Admiralty with us, and the manner in which our proposals
were met, form very pleasant memories of my term of office at the
Admiralty. During the greater part of the year 1917 Admiral Lacaze was
Minister of Marine, whilst Admiral de Bon held office as Chief of the
Naval Staff during the whole year. Nothing could exceed the courtesy
extended to me by these distinguished officers, for whom I conceived
great admiration and respect.

The result of the altered arrangement was a dec