STATES; OUR NAVAL POLICY EXPLAINED

The entry of the United States of America into the war in April, 1917,
had an important although not an immediate effect upon our Naval policy.
That the effect was not immediate was due to the fact that the United
States Navy was at the time indifferently provided with the particular
classes of vessels which were so greatly needed for submarine warfare,
viz. destroyers and other small surface craft, submarines and light
cruisers; further, the United States mercantile fleet did not include
any considerable number of small craft which could be usefully employed
for patrol and escort duty. The armed forces of the United States of
America were also poorly equipped with aircraft, and had none available
for Naval work. According to our knowledge at the time the United States
Navy, in April, 1917, possessed twenty-three large and about twenty-four
small destroyers, some of which were unfit to cross the Atlantic; there
were about twelve submarines capable of working overseas, but not well
suited for anti-submarine work, and only three light cruisers of the
"Chester" class. On the other hand about seven armoured cruisers were
available in Atlantic waters for convoy duties, and the Navy included a
fine force of battleships, of which fourteen were in full commission in
April.

At first, therefore, it was clear that the assistance which could be
given to the Allied Navies would be but slight even if all available
destroyers were sent to European waters. This was, presumably, well
known to the members of the German Naval Staff, and possibly explains
their view that the entry of the United States of America would be of
little help to the Allied cause. The Germans did not, however, make
sufficient allowance for the productive power of the United States, and
perhaps also it was thought in Germany that public opinion in the United
States would not allow the Navy Department to send over to European
waters such destroyers and other vessels of value in anti-submarine
warfare as were available at once or would be available as time
progressed. The German Staff may have had in mind the situation during
the Spanish-American War when the fact of Admiral Cervera's weak and
inefficient squadron being at large was sufficient to affect adversely
the naval strategy of the United States to a considerable extent and to
paralyze the work of the United States Navy in an offensive direction.

Very fortunately fo