discussion.

The Belgian coast barrage being in the nature of a surprise was probably
more useful as a deterrent to submarine activity in 1916 than in 1917.
In both years a strong patrol of monitors, destroyers, minesweepers,
drifters for net repairs, and other vessels was maintained in position
to the westward of the barrage to prevent interference with the nets by
enemy vessels and to keep them effective.

These vessels were patrolling daily within 13 or 14 sea miles of the two
enemy destroyer and submarine bases, and although occasionally attacked,
were not driven off in spite of the superior destroyer force which the
enemy could always bring to bear. In 1917 actions between our vessels
and those of the enemy, and between our own and enemy aircraft, were of
very frequent occurrence. The Germans also introduced a new weapon in
the form of fast motor boats controlled by a cable from the shore and
guided by signals from aircraft, these boats being heavily loaded in the
fore part with explosives which detonated on contact with any vessels
attacked. On only one occasion in four attacks were the boats successful
in hitting their mark, and the monitor _Terror_, which was struck in
this instance, although considerably damaged in her bulge protection,
was successfully brought back to port and repaired.

Whilst our monitors were on patrol near the barrage, as well as on other
occasions, every favourable opportunity was taken of bombarding the
bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. In the former case the targets fired at
were the lock gates, and in the latter the workshops, to which
considerable damage was frequently occasioned, as well as to vessels
lying in the basin.

These bombardments were carried out in 1917 at distances exceeding
25,000 yards. The long range was necessary on account of the net
barrage, and also because of the rapidity with which the "Knocke" and
"Tirpitz" shore batteries obtained the range of monitors attacking them,
one hit on an unprotected monitor being sufficient to sink her.

They were also invariably carried out under the protection of a smoke
screen; in the autumn of 1917 the enemy commenced to start a smoke
screen himself as soon as we opened fire, thus interfering with our
observation of fire even from aircraft, but in spite of this much damage
resulted from the bombardments. Our observation of fire being
necessarily carried out by aircraft, and the enemy attempting similar
measures in his return