afer when
sailing singly than when in convoy. It has also been stated that the
Admiralty held the view at this time that no solution of the problem
created by the enemy's submarine campaign was in sight. This is
incorrect. We had confidence in the measures--most of them dependent on
the manufacture of material--which were in course of preparation by the
time the United States entered the war, but our opinion was that there
was no _immediate_ solution beyond the provision of additional vessels
for the protection of shipping, and the reason for this view was that
time was required before other measures could be put into effective
operation; this is evident from the final paragraph of my telegram to
Admiral de Chair, dated April 26, which I have quoted.

The first division of six United States destroyers, under the command of
Lieut.-Commander T.K. Taussig, arrived in British waters on May 2, and
they were most welcome. It was interesting to me personally that
Lieut.-Commander Taussig should be in command, as he, when a
sub-lieutenant, had been wounded on the same day as myself during the
Boxer campaign in China, and we had been together for some time
subsequently.

At about this time our advice was sought by the United States Navy
Department as to the best type of anti-submarine craft for the United
States to build; on this subject a very short experience in the war
theatre caused Admiral Sims to hold precisely similar views to myself.
As a result of the advice tendered a great building programme of
destroyers, large submarine-hunting motor launches and other small craft
was embarked upon. Although the completion of these vessels was delayed
considerably beyond anticipated dates, they did, in 1918, exercise an
influence on the submarine war.

The Germans made one great mistake, for which we were thankful. As
already mentioned, it was anticipated that they would send submarines to
work off the United States coast immediately after the declaration of
war by that country. Indeed we were expecting to hear of the presence of
submarines in the West Atlantic throughout the whole of 1917. They did
not appear there until May, 1918. The moral effect of such action in
1917 would have been very great and might possibly have led to the
retention in the United States of some of the destroyers and other small
craft which were of such assistance in European waters in starting the
convoy system. Admiral Sims was himself, I think, anxiou