itself.
We mentioned that a close blockade of the German North Sea and Baltic
ports presented insuperable difficulties under the conditions of modern
warfare, and the alternative of controlling the Dover and
Norway-Scotland exits to the North Sea had been adopted. The former
protected the communications of the armies in France, whilst the two
combined covered the maritime communications of the world outside the
North Sea and Baltic, and if they could be effectively guarded our first
two objects would be attained.
So far as the Dover exit was concerned we stated that the narrowness of
the waters, with the consequent risk to the enemy from our mines and
torpedoes, had so far acted as a deterrent to his capital ships; we had
to depend on the light forces at Harwich and Dover to deal with any
enemy surface craft attacking the southern area from German ports.
We pointed out that the control of the Norway-Scotland exit depended
upon the presence of the Grand Fleet at Rosyth or at Scapa. This fleet
ensured the safety of all the vessels engaged in protecting trade and in
hunting submarines outside the North Sea.
Mention was made of the fact that the enemy could not open the sea
routes for his own war ships without risking a serious action, and that
so far he had shown no inclination to run that risk. The Battle of
Jutland having been fought in the previous year, any future movement of
the High Sea Fleet into the North Sea would probably be merely with the
object of drawing our capital ships into prepared areas so as to bring
about a process of attrition by mines and torpedoes. Such a movement had
been carried out on August 19, 1916. The reasons which had led to the
adoption of the Orkney-Faroe-Iceland blockade line were also explained.
It was pointed out that in the early stages of the war, the foregoing
general dispositions had sufficed to protect the Allies' communications
and to throttle those of the enemy outside the Baltic. Although enemy
cruisers in foreign waters and a few raiding vessels which had evaded
the blockade had inflicted losses on trade, losses from such causes
could not reach really serious proportions so long as the enemy trusted
to evasion and refused to face the Grand Fleet. The danger of serious
loss from attack by raiding surface craft had also been greatly
minimized by the adoption of the convoy system. But as the enemy's
submarines increased in size, efficiency and numbers, the situation had
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