been modified, for evasion by submarines of the command exercised by the
Grand Fleet was easy, and our vital sea communications could be attacked
by them without the risk of a fleet action.
So far as the protection of trade was concerned, the effect therefore of
the submarine campaign had been to remove the barrier established by the
Grand Fleet and to transfer operations to the focal areas and approach
routes.
As the situation developed, a policy of dealing with the submarines by
armed patrol craft and decoy ships in these areas had therefore been put
into force. Merchant ships had been armed as rapidly as possible, and in
addition efforts had been made to intercept the submarines _en route_ to
these areas both in the vicinity of German waters and farther afield.
The great area covered by the approach routes and the increasing radius
of submarine operations had made the provision of a sufficient number of
patrol vessels a practical impossibility and had led to a general
adoption of the convoy system as rapidly as the supply of fast small
craft made this possible.
The methods of attacking German submarines before they could reach open
waters, by extensive mining in the Heligoland Bight, with the exception
of Dutch and Danish territorial waters, were also mentioned.
As regards _future_ naval policy it was pointed out that the enemy
submarine campaign was the dominating factor to such an extent that any
sustained increase in the then rate of sinking merchant ships might
eventually prove disastrous.
Mention was made of the fact that the enemy was still producing
submarines faster than the Allies were destroying them; the policy of
coping with submarines after they reached the open sea had not as yet
been sufficiently effective to balance construction against losses, even
in combination with the extensive minefields laid in the Heligoland
Bight.
The future policy was therefore being directed towards an attempt at a
still more concentrated and effective control in the areas between the
enemy's ports and our trade routes, and it was proposed to form some
description of block or barrage through which the enemy submarines would
not be able to pass without considerable risk. Four forms had been
considered:
(1) A method of blocking either mechanically or by mines all the exits
of the submarines from their North Sea or Baltic bases.
(2) A barrage of mines at different depths, from near the surface of the
sea t
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