ere saved.

Admiral Calthorpe on leaving England was charged with the duty of
organizing convoys in the Mediterranean on the lines of those already in
force in other waters as soon as the necessary vessels were available,
and a conference of Allied officers sat at Malta soon after his arrival,
when a definite scheme of convoy was prepared. There had always,
however, been a great scarcity of fast patrol vessels in the
Mediterranean for this work. Divided control of the forces in that area
was partly responsible for this. The Austrian destroyers were considered
by the Italian Admiralty to be so serious a menace in the Adriatic as to
render it necessary to keep in that sea the great majority of the
Italian destroyers as well as several French vessels of this class. The
situation at the eastern end of the Mediterranean necessitated a force
of some eight British destroyers being kept in the Aegean Sea to deal
with any Turkish vessels that might attempt to force the blockade of the
Dardanelles, whilst operations on the Syrian coast engaged the services
of some French and British destroyers. Continual troop movements in the
Mediterranean also absorbed the sendees of a considerable number of
vessels of this type.

Consequently there was a great shortage of fast small craft for escort
and mercantile convoy work. It was estimated that the escort force
required for the protection of a complete system of convoy in the
Mediterranean was approximately 290 vessels, the total number available
being about 215.

In spite, then, of the success of Admiral Calthorpe's work, the result
was that convoys were not started in the Mediterranean until October,
and they were then but inadequately protected, and losses were heavy,
both from this cause and from the fact already mentioned--that the
Mediterranean is a sea which, by reason of its confined nature, is
particularly suited for operations by submarines against trade. Its
narrowness at various points, such as the Straits of Gibraltar, the
Malta Channel, the Straits of Messina, and the passages to the AEgean
cause such convergence of trade as to make it a very simple matter for a
submarine to operate with success. Evasion by change of route is almost
impossible. Operations designed to prevent the exit of submarines from
the Adriatic were difficult, because the depth of water in the Straits
of Otranto militated against the adoption of effective mining and the
laying of an effective net barra