ference was to assemble at Scapa on December 10. An
officer from the Naval Staff was detailed to attend the conference, to
point out the objections which had been raised and, amongst other
matters, to bring to notice the advantage of the Firth of Forth as a
collecting port instead of the Tyne.

Meanwhile steps had been taken to furnish as much protection as possible
from Grand Fleet resources to the convoys against attack by enemy
surface vessels.

The conference of December 10 came to the conclusion that the Firth of
Forth was the best assembly place, and that the port of Methil in that
locality would offer great advantages. The conference made
recommendations as to the provision of destroyers as soon as they were
available, and, amongst other matters, mentioned the necessity for an
increase in the minesweeping force at Rosyth to meet a possible
extension of enemy minelaying when the new system was in operation.

On December 12 a second attack on the convoy took place. In this
instance the attack was carried out by four German destroyers. Two
convoys were at sea, one east-bound and one west-bound, the east-bound
convoy being attacked. It was screened against submarine attack by two
destroyers--the _Pellew_ and _Partridge_--and four armed trawlers, and
comprised six vessels, one being British and the remainder neutrals. The
attack took place in approximately Lat. 59.50 N., Long. 3.50 E., and the
action resulted in the _Partridge_, the four trawlers, and the whole of
the convoy being sunk, and the _Pellew_ was so severely damaged as to be
incapable of continuing the action. At the time of this attack a
west-bound convoy was at sea to the westward of the other convoy, and
two armoured cruisers--the _Shannon_ and _Minotaur_--with four
destroyers were acting as a covering force for the convoys against
attack by surface vessels. A wireless signal from the _Partridge_ having
been intercepted, this force steamed at full speed for the scene of the
action, the destroyers arriving in time to pick up 100 survivors from
the convoy and trawlers, but not in time to save the convoy. The 3rd
Light Cruiser Squadron, also at sea, was some 85 miles to the southward
and eastward of the convoy when attacked, but neither this force nor the
_Shannon's_ force succeeded in intercepting the enemy before he reached
port. The short hours of daylight greatly facilitated his escape.

On receipt of the report of the meeting of December 10, and in