for just under 50
per cent. of the month.

This meant that several destroyers in these flotillas averaged quite 60
per cent. or even 70 per cent. of their time under way, as other vessels
of the flotilla were laid up during the periods under review for long
refits due to collision or other damage, in addition to the necessary
four-monthly refit.

Anyone familiar with the delicate nature of the machinery of
destroyers--which needs constant attention--and the conditions of life
at sea in them will appreciate the significance of these figures and the
strain which the conditions imposed on those on board as well as on the
machinery.

It was evident in November, 1917, that the personnel and the machinery,
whilst standing the strain in a wonderful manner, were approaching the
limit of endurance, and anxiety was felt as to the situation during the
winter.

Reports came in from the Grand Fleet indicating that the work of the
destroyers engaged in protecting the ships of the Scandinavian convoy
was telling heavily on the personnel, particularly on the commanding
officers, and one report stated that the convoy work produced far
greater strain than any other duty carried out by destroyers. No mean
proportion of the officers were suffering from a breakdown in health,
and since the _whole_ of the work of the Devonport, Queenstown and North
of Ireland flotillas consisted of convoy duty, whilst only a portion of
the Grand Fleet destroyers was engaged in this work, the opinions
expressed were very disquieting in their relation to the work of the
southern flotillas.

However, the destroyers held on here as elsewhere, but it is only just
to the splendid endurance of the young officers and the men who manned
them to emphasize as strongly as I can the magnificent work they carried
out in the face of every difficulty, and without even the incentive of
the prospect of a fight with a foe that could be seen, this being the
compensation given in their work to the gallant personnel of the Dover,
Harwich and Grand Fleet flotillas. The convoy flotillas knew that their
only chance of action was with a submarine submerged, a form of warfare
in which the result was so very frequently unknown and therefore
unsatisfactory.

Under the new conditions the Admiralty took upon itself responsibility
for the control of the ships of the Mercantile Marine in addition to its
control of the movements of the Fleet. Indeed the control of convoys was
even