more directly under the Admiralty than was the control of the
Fleet. In the latter case the proper system is for the Admiralty to
indicate to the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, or to other Commands
the objective, and to supply all the information possible regarding the
strength of the enemy, his intentions and movements and such other
information as can be of use to the Commander-in-Chief, but to leave the
handling of the force to the Commander-in-Chief concerned. This is the
course which was usually followed during the late war. It was my
invariable practice when at the Admiralty.

In the case of convoys, however, a different system was necessary owing
to the difficulty of transmitting information, the great delay that
would be caused were this attempted, and the impossibility of control
being exercised over all convoys at sea except by the Admiralty.
Consequently the actual movements of convoys for the greater part of
their passage were directed by the Naval Staff. Owing to ships not
showing lights at night, convoys were diverted clear of one another by
wireless signal if they were getting into dangerous proximity; they were
directed to alter course as necessary to avoid areas in which submarines
had been located, and occasionally it became necessary to alter the
destination of some ships as they approached home waters. The movements
of all convoys were "plotted" from day to day, indeed from hour to hour,
on a large-scale chart at the Admiralty, and it was easy to see at a
glance the position of all the ships at any given time.

As the convoy approached home waters the ships came within the areas of
the Commanders-in-Chief, Coast of Ireland, Devonport, and Portsmouth,
and the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Dover Patrol, and were taken in
charge by one or other of them. At each port a staff existed which kept
a constant record of the movements of ships passing through or working
in the Command, and enabled the Commander-in-Chief to take instant
action if occasion arose.

The success of the convoy system in protecting trade is best shown by
the figures relating to the year 1917 on the succeeding page (p. 144).
In considering these figures the loose station-keeping of the ships in
the Scandinavian convoy must be borne in mind. A large proportion of the
ships in this convoy were neutrals, and it was naturally not possible to
bring these vessels under discipline as was the case with convoys
composed of purely British ship