the intention of attacking with torpedoes, but was sunk by gunfire
before she could achieve her object. The enemy vessels then attacked the
convoy, sinking all except the British and Belgian vessels, which
escaped undamaged. The _Strongbow_, shelled at close range, returned the
fire, using guns and torpedoes, but was completely overwhelmed by the
guns of the light cruisers and sank at about 9.30 A.M. The trawler
_Elsie_ effected very fine rescue work amongst the survivors both from
the _Strongbow_ and ships of the convoy, whilst under fire, and both
trawlers reached Lerwick. The enemy sheered off soon after 8.0 A.M. Most
unfortunately neither the _Strongbow_ nor the _Mary Rose_ succeeded in
getting a wireless signal through to our own vessels to report the
presence of enemy ships, otherwise there can be little doubt that they
would have been intercepted and sunk. We had in the North Sea, during
the night before the attack and during the day of the attack, a
particularly strong force of light cruisers comprising four or possibly
five squadrons (a total of not less than sixteen vessels), all to the
southward of the convoy route, and had the information of the attack
come through from the destroyers, these vessels would have been informed
at once and would have had an excellent chance of intercepting the
enemy. The extreme difficulty of preventing the egress of raiders from
the North Sea at night, even when so large a force is cruising, was well
illustrated by this incident, although a little reflection on the wide
area of water to be covered, together with a knowledge of the distance
that the eye can cover on a dark night (some 200 to 300 yards), would
show how very great are the chances in favour of evasion.
This disaster to the Scandinavian convoy was bound to bring into
prominence the question of affording to it protection against future
attacks by surface vessels, for necessarily the protection against
surface vessels differed from that against submarines, a point which was
sometimes overlooked by those who were unfamiliar with the demands of
the two wars which were being waged--the one on the surface and the
other under the surface. It was very difficult to furnish efficient
protection against the surface form of attack from the resources of the
Grand Fleet if the practice of running a daily convoy was continued,
because it was impossible to forecast the strength or exact
character--battle-cruisers, cruisers or destr
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