quated vessels was less serious than
that of over 1400 trained officers and men. A shock to British
traditions came with the new order that ships must abandon injured
consorts and make all speed away.

In the bases at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, which at the outbreak of
war were totally unprotected against submarines and thought to
be beyond their reach, the Grand Fleet felt less secure than when
cruising on the open sea. Safer refuges were sought temporarily
on the west coast of Scotland and at Lough Swilly in the north
of Ireland, but even off this latter base on October 27, the big
dreadnought _Audacious_ was sunk by mines laid by the German auxiliary
cruiser _Berlin_. In view of the impending Turkish crisis, the loss
was not admitted by the Admiralty, though since pictures of the
sinking ship had actually been taken by passengers on the White
Star liner _Olympic_, it could not long remain concealed. Mines and
submarines had seemingly put the British navy on the defensive,
even if consolation could be drawn from the fact that troops and
supplies were crossing safely to France, the enemy had been held
up at the Marne, the German surface fleet was passive, and the
blockade was closing down.

_Escape of the "Goeben" and the "Breslau"_

In distant waters Germany at the outbreak of the war had only ten
cruisers--_Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Nuernberg_, and _Leipzig_
in the Pacific, _Koenigsberg_ on the east coast of Africa,
_Karlsruhe_ and _Dresden_ in the West Indies, and _Goeben_
and _Breslau_ in the Mediterranean. Within six months' time,
these, together with a few auxiliary cruisers fitted out abroad,
were either destroyed or forced to intern in neutral ports. Modern
wireless communication, difficulties of coaling and supply, and
the overwhelming naval strength of the Allies made the task of
surface raiders far more difficult than in previous wars. They
were nevertheless skillfully handled, and, operating in the wide
ocean areas, created a troublesome problem for the Western Powers.

The battle cruiser _Goeben_ and the light cruiser _Breslau_
alone, operating under Admiral Souchon in Mediterranean waters,
accomplished ultimate results which would have easily justified
the sacrifice of ten times the number of ships lost by Germany in
distant seas. To hunt down these two vessels, and at the same time
contain the Austrian Navy, the Entente had in the Mediterranean
not only the bulk of the French fleet but also 3 batt